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The following chapter is the last chapter in the book Copyright, Libraries, and the Public 
Interest by Michelle M. Wu (Hein, forthcoming 2020), and this draft version is being posted with 
the approval of the publisher. 
 
Earlier chapters of this book provide a history of copyright and libraries in the United 
States, a review of outdated language in the existing copyright code, and a discussion of actions 
by both copyright owners and the public to rebalance copyright outside of legislation. This 
chapter simply imagines what copyright could be if we disregard the known political and legal 
obstacles. It starts with no constraints, which one might argue is both impractical and foolish. 
Why spend time discussing what could be when treaties, self-interest, and powerful industry 
lobbies stand in the way? 
The answer is simply that environments can be changed. They have been changed 
throughout history, whether through legislation (e.g., copyright terms), case law (e.g., fair use in 
relation to technology), or ground roots movements (e.g., the initial movement to recognize 
authors’ rights). And if one hopes to change history, why not start first by exploring possibilities 
that we might not consider otherwise?  Refusing to consider change out of fear of opposition 
translates to a voluntary surrender of power.  
Beginning with restraints also blinds one to possibilities of a much better construct than 
could be achieved with them.  If everything has to fit in a box, people will often discard anything 
they think won’t fit at the outset. Only by removing the box can we imagine the full range of 
benefits of a given course of action. If the outcome is desired, then efforts can turn to whether or 
not there is a way to fit the outcome into the box. Or to decide if the benefits are so great that 
destruction of the box is in society’s best interest. A vision should start with where one thinks the 
world should be, and then reality can help to shape the path. 
Because this is the last chapter in the book, to fully understand how the guiding interests 
were chosen, one would need to read the preceding chapters. 
Chapter 11 
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It is doubtful that the enactment of further merely partial or temporizing legislation 
will afford satisfactory remedies for the insufficiencies and inconsistencies of the 
present laws. The subject should be dealt with as a whole, and the insufficient and 
antiquated laws now in force be replaced by one consistent, liberal, and adequate 
statute.466 
Building on the interests honed in the last chapter, this chapter proposes a new set of building blocks 
for copyright. Unlike section II, no model language is proposed as the emphasis is on the outcomes, 
not on the advantages or disadvantages of any specific wording. Where there is support for any 
principle, wordsmithing can come later.  
This book is not the first to take a clean-slate approach. Giblin and Weatherall attempted the 
same in their book, What if We Could Reimagine Copyright?,467 and in some ways, that was a more 
thorough endeavor, attempting a world-wide view with each chapter focused on a different author’s 
vision on a particular topic within copyright. This book differs in that it focuses only on the United 
States, its history, and identified interests, disclaiming the necessary expertise to understand all of the 
motivations for copyright in the many regimes found across the world. It is more unified, though, as 
all proposals are designed to work with each other in mind.  
Even though this approach may seem insular, that is not its intention. Recognition of 
copyright worldwide, and respect for the rights of authors and the public in all nations, is important 
and compelling. From a practical perspective, though, how nations implement copyright is already so 
varied, despite the existence of copyright treaties, that the current system cannot be considered 
unified or consistent.  The framework articulated below could well be proposed worldwide, but in its 
reasoning, it does not account for each country’s priorities nor does it pretend to present a weighting 
system that could accommodate them all in equal measure.   
To start, I will list again the interests that underlay the proposals below: 1) rewarding the 
creation of works (private interest, full weight); (2) rewards proportional to the contribution to the 
creative work (private interest, full weight); (3) preventing reputational damage (private interest, 
discounted weight); (4) wide access to information and preservation of the same (public interest, full 
weight); (5) protection of limited, unpaid uses where public benefit outweighs injury to the first 
interest (public interest, full weight); (6) growing the public domain to encourage future creation of 
works and wider access (public interest, full weight), and (7) creating sufficient incentives for 
secondary players to assist creators in bringing their works to market (public interest, discounted 
weight).  
Each subsection below will describe a proposed part of the overall framework, which of the 
interests are served by the subsection, and how they will be served. 
466 S. REP. NO. 1108, at 2 (1909) (citing THORVALD SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS, 1789-1904 (1905)). 
467 WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017), 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1q1crjg. 




The exclusive rights that an author would control during a copyright term would be similar to the 
ones recognized today, though there would be one notable change. The current rights are 
reproduction, distribution, the creation of derivative works, public performance, and public display. 
This proposal suggests expanding the “public” qualifier to the first and third of these rights, therefore 
removing the author’s control of any private action undertaken by a user in the normal course of 
using a copy of a work that she has legitimately acquired.  
 Of the interests named in the introduction, this altered language aims to protect limited, 
unpaid uses where public benefit outweighs injury to the private interest of author income and 
control. No legitimate author interest is served by limiting a user’s access to a copy that she has 
legitimately acquired. The author would have already been paid for his work when the copy was first 
sold, so any private interest in being paid for this copy is satisfied. The public benefit from the 
narrowing of rights comes in the form of users being able to use the work in the manner and form 
most suited to their needs. 
How this might be expressed is in a revised listing of rights is: reproduction for non-personal 
use, public distribution, derivative works exposed to public use, public performance, and public 
display. Personal use would then be defined as individual use by the owner of a legitimately-acquired 
copy of a work while she has legal possession and control of that legitimately-acquired copy. 
 This language would mean that that someone who buys a copy of music could duplicate it for 
the purpose of her personal use on multiple devices. Or, if she buys an e-book, she can use screen 
reading software to create an audio file for playback on her way into the office. She would be free to 
abridge or translate a work (i.e., create a derivative work) for her personal use. But should any of the 
copies or derivative works that she has made be disseminated beyond herself, she loses the protection 




Legislatures continue to extend copyright with the expressed hope of giving greater economic 
security to authors and reducing the ability of others to profit from the work without payment, but 
every enactment has benefitted commercial entities above all others. This section aims to better 
balance the interests of copyright by recognizing that the interests of all cannot, and need not, be met 
by a single term. By looking at the legitimate issues of each group --- an author’s desire to make a 
living from their work, the public’s hunger for greater access, and the industry’s need for sufficient 
profit to justify investment in creative works – one can see a path forward that will speak to every 
interest. By splitting the term of protection based on use, the nation could protect both the creator and 
the public more effectively. 
 
Short Term for Free Uses 
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Independent researchers the world over have proven that long copyright terms help only a very small 
minority of individuals.468  If the purpose of copyright is to encourage the creation of new works, this 
can effectively be accomplished by providing a short copyright term of 20 years from publication. 
This term is loosely derived from Pollock’s calculations for the optimal copyright term, based on 
books and recordings, of fifteen years.469  Another scholar, Giblin, makes the argument that while 
terms should be shortened, each type of work should have a different term, and she provides as an 
example the value of software as having shorter commercial longevity than films.470 While true, I 
have opted to treat most works as the same, using the same shortened term, slightly longer than 
Pollock’s optimal term, for simplicity for the user. This is same reason that drives the marker for the 
start of the term back to the publication date instead of the author’s life. The latter is highly variable 
and may require significant research,471 whereas the publication date should be more easily found. 
Within those first 20 years, the author would have all the exclusive rights normally associated 
with copyright – as described and modified above - with the few exceptions described in later 
subsections. After those 20 years, a work could be freely used, but only for non-commercial uses. 
In practice, what would this mean? It means that 20 years after publication, any entity could 
legally reproduce an unlimited number of copies of that work or post it online; if that work is a 
musical, it could be performed in schools without paying license fees; and documentarians could 
freely use photos, film clips, and artwork from the work, up to and including using the whole work 
(e.g., running commentary on a film) as desired.  
To counter legitimate criticisms by creators that their works are exploited for great economic 
gain by non-creators once they fall into the public domain, this short-term would only be applicable 
where the subsequent use carries no commercial weight. For example, if an organization wishes to 
post a full-text book online without restriction twenty-one years after publication, it may do so. If it 
chooses to charge for access to that same work, though, it would be seen as a commercial enterprise 
and would be ineligible to use the work without payment to the author (see the following subsection). 
There are, of course, many ways an entity could derive indirect commercial benefits from the 
free use of creative works. For example, a bookseller could make content available for free but 
charge for printing and binding if readers wanted a physical format over a digital one, or a movie 
theater could still charge the cost of a seat if viewers wish to see a movie set in its intended arena. In 
theory, these entities could mark up the services such that they cost as much as the work would have 
cost if still protected by copyright. Such markup would not be prohibited, but two effects of the 
shorter term for free uses should minimize the chances for exploitation. 
First, there will very likely be multiple entities that make the work freely available in 
multiple forms, whether public libraries, organizations like the Internet Archive, or simply 
individuals who are fans of the work. Second, other organizations are free to offer the same added 
services at lower costs. In other words, the environment would be one that is highly competitive, 
                                                            
468 Patry, supra note 201 at 59; See also, infra Chapter 9: Copyright Reform – Reviewing Ongoing Proposals, 
Sections on Reinstating Formalities and Duration 
469 Rufus Pollock, Forever Minus a Day? Some Theory and Empirics of Optimal Copyright 26 (Munich Pers. RePEc 
Archive, Paper No. 5024, 2007), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5024/1/MPRA_paper_5024.pdf. 
470 Giblin, supra note 372 at 199.  
471 Patry, supra note 201 at 194. 
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where unreasonably marked up costs are unlikely to be rewarded by the consumer, even the 
consumer willing to pay for a different format than is freely available.  
Overall, the shorter term determined by use is designed to give the author the strongest 
opportunities to generate income from their work during the years that the work will be most 
commercially viable. Admittedly, this short term disadvantages the most popular authors, but 
copyright is not intended to maximize profits, only to put the author in a position to make a living 
from their works. As there will continue to other income streams available to the popular author 
(some examples described in the next section), the loss of some revenue to a minority of creators 
does not justify the harm to the public resulting in a longer term.  
After 20 years, the public interest outweighs the minimal benefit the author would claim by 
keeping the same level of control, and the work is released to all to use for free. The author, if he 
desires the same level of control or opportunity for income, will need to create new works or 
derivative works. And the public domain is enriched, as the shorter term enables wide dissemination 
of the original work and non-profit derivative uses. 
 
Extended Term for Commercial Use 
 
This section addresses any use that does not fall into the category of free use, and it proposes a longer 
term of protection: 100 years after publication. For ease of using shorthand, we will call this use 
commercial use and define it broadly as any use that charges the user for the content of the work. The 
categorization of the actor or industry – for-profit, non-profit – is irrelevant to the commerciality of 
the use itself. Either it charges for content or it does not. In other words, whether a bookstore or a 
library charges users for a content of a book, neither could do so during the term of protection 
without paying the author.472   
The term of protection for commercial use is a bit arbitrary, not based on any study or economic 
analysis, but rather designed to be lengthy enough to discourage any industry from waiting out the 
copyright period before exploiting the work (e.g., making a movie from a popular book). The same 
factors that have narrowed the diversity of creative works – the desire only to invest in products, 
genres, stories, that are already known to be successful473 – will in this instance work in favor of the 
author.  
Hot properties often do not hold their allure for long, and it is in the interests of large 
corporations to strike when interest is high. A 20-year term of protection may not necessarily 
dissuade companies from delaying use, especially where a property is a serial one with continued 
popularity (e.g., Harry Potter), but a corporation’s willingness to wait a hundred years is unlikely for 
the same reason that economists have determined that the present value of a long copyright term will 
                                                            
472 Note that any entity could still provide a kiosk where a user could print out a book and pay for the number of 
pages copied. That would not be a commercial use of the content, as the charge would be for the paper/ink. 
473 Patry, supra note 201 at 23–27 (providing anecdotal data to illustrate how incentives  actually make those who 
make the most profit off of copyright – such as motion picture industries -- reluctant to risk. They want to invest 
primarily in works that they know will be successful, so derivative works, instead of culturally diverse works get 
greenlit.). 
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not incentivize creation or investment in creation.474 It is the potential for current or short-term 
revenue that factors most heavily in decision-making. 
During this 100-year term, the creator’s work would receive the maximum protection from 
copyright as against commercial uses, and any prospective user would have to negotiate terms in the 
usual manner, either directly with the creator, or through licensing organizations, managers, or others 
as designated by the creator. This is where the purpose of the split term becomes evident. As seen in 
the testimony reproduced in the earlier chapters, authors have long complained that when a work 
falls into the public domain, the only people who benefit are industry actors. The split term 
essentially creates an early public domain while still requiring payment for commercial uses. While 
this will not address the author’s concern after the 100-year period passes and the work truly passes 
into the public domain, it does counter the argument that terms cannot be shortened without 
disadvantaging the author in favor of industry giants. 
There will, of course, be exceptions and instances where even a 100-year term will not prevent an 
industry from profiting from a work without payment to the creator. Examples today would include 
the many public-domain adaptations of Little Women, Sherlock Holmes, and Pride and Prejudice. In 
the end analysis, though, there are relatively few works able to achieve this level of continued 
success, and ultimately, the desire is not to prevent entertainment industries from eventually 
benefitting from the public domain, much as the general public does, but simply to weight the scales 
such that authors are more likely than not to gain much of that financial benefit over the course of 




To avoid disuse in the 100-year term while a work is still commercially viable, whether that disuse is 
through purchasing a work and then suppressing it475 or simply discontinuing publication,476 
reproduction and distribution of those reproductions would be authorized under compulsory licensing 
where a work becomes unavailable for a year after commercial publication or after delivery of a 
work for publication.  The first standard would be for works published but falling quickly out of the 
market; in such cases, any other commercial user would have the ability to exploit the work within 
the 100-year period, but only with some payment to the creator.   
The alternative --- one year after delivery of a work for publication --- is intended for 
instances where the purchaser buys publication rights only to suppress the work.  Since suppression 
flies against every interest in copyright, compulsory licensing appropriately subverts such intent by 
permitting publication even before any commercial distribution has occurred.  In these instances, 
alternative publishers would not know of the delivery date without assistance.  
                                                            
474 Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8–10, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186 (2003) (No. 01-618), https://cyber.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/economists.pdf. 
475 David Voreacos, Chris Dolmetsch, &  Gerry Smith, Tabloid Company’s Admission Shows New Peril for Trump’s 
Circle, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-12/american-media-in-non-prosecution-
agreement-with-prosecutors  
476 See supra note 401. 
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In both instances, a free registry could alert potential commercial users to the availability of a 
work, and the population of the registry would depend on creators. In the first instance, the author 
could provide a description of the work, link to the publisher, insert the publication date, and certify 
the date the work was no longer available from the publisher. Most of the information could also be 
independently verified by the prospective user. In the second instance, the author could provide a 
description of the work, upload the agreement for publication (with any personal details stricken for 
privacy reason), and certify the date of delivery of the work. Any user wishing to publish the work 
would need to notify the rightsholder (as noted in the registry) of such intention 30-days prior to 
publication. This allows that rightsholder to object to falsified or incorrect data submitted by the 
author.   
Compulsory licensing would preserve income streams for authors whose works fall out of 
“print” in the normal course of publishing, as other publishers might be willing to market and sell the 
work where the original publisher no longer has interest. Compulsory licensing prices would be 
preset, whether by the government or an independent, external organization, and would automatically 




The greatest challenge in application of the split term is likely to fall in the area of remixes where the 
20-year term has passed but the 100-year term is ongoing. Remixes would include efforts such as 
colorization of movies, sampling of songs, the use of movie clips in other movies, and inclusion of 
photographs or artworks in books.   
If the remixer makes the subsequent work available for free, there is no question. The use 
clearly falls under the 20-year term and can be undertaken without payment to the original creator. 
But if the remixer charges for the subsequent work, even if the majority of the work is his own (e.g. 
where only 5-beat sample from one work is used in another), then the 100-year term applies.  
I could foresee, though, a hybrid approach, where a remixer charges a lower market rate for 
the remix, claiming that access to the portions of the original work is free, and that the charge is only 
for the added content.  For example, if the average market price for a song is $1, a remixer might 
charge only 80 cents for a remix, where less than 20% of his remix is comprised of pre-existing 
works. 
Logically, this approach is sound and acknowledges both the public and author interests of 
copyright. Due to the moral rights outlined below, the author of the original work would receive 
credit for her portion of the new work, and ideally, more users listening to her original work due to 
new exposures through the remix. The new revenue reaching the remixer rewards both the new 
creation and the creative use of a preexisting work. Since the use is one that the original author did 
not instigate, she should have no expectation of income from it.  The reward rightly goes to the 
creation of a new work and the exposure of a pre-existing work to new audiences, both principle 
interests of copyright. And the reduction of reward is proportional to the amount of pre-existing 
works used, preventing unjust enrichment, which is also an interest this framework seeks to protect. 
Practically speaking, though, many cases may not be as straightforward.   For instance, how 
would a production company measure the value of coloration versus the content of the original 
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movie?  The original work has value without the added content, but the added content does not have 
any value without the original.  Cases such as these might need to be adjudicated by courts or 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and will likely be expensive endeavors as each side 




Some of the concerns raised by authors in the use of their work are analyzed best through the lens of 
a natural right. A natural right is one that is described as not attaching through the grant of a 
government or other institution, but rather naturally attaching to an individual.477 In relation to 
copyright, a natural rights argument would be that a work is an extension of the author and is 
attached at creation so requires no recognition by a government to exist.  
Since a work is the expression of an individual, its creator may feel that they have a personal 
stake in the use of their work. Where a work reflects on the author, one can sympathize if she feels 
more keenly its misuse, as such misuse has the potential not only of affecting her immediate revenue 
stream but also her reputation and future business. At the same time, public interest weighs against 
allowing an author’s personal feelings to dictate all uses of a work, certainly in the long term but also 
in some cases in the short term. For example, an author’s personal feelings should not allow her to 
restrict access to a book only to those of a certain religion or nationality, though she certainly could 
choose a publisher more likely to reach a specific target audience. 
In the battle over moral rights, the public interest lies mostly in access and preservation, 
whereas an author’s interest falls almost entirely in use, and it is in recognition of this difference that 
a new framework for moral rights is suggested, one which does not limit access to the work but 
enables the creator to sanction or censure the use if desired.  
This new moral rights protection would run until the author’s death, whether the use is 
commercial or not. The length of this right is calibrated to its purpose. Since an author’s reputation is 
the one that faces potential harm from use of her work, and since an author could only be presumed 
to support a use when alive, the interest dies upon her passing. While reputations might still be 
harmed after death (e.g., criticism of the person or work), a work’s use no longer holds the power of 
implied creator approval when the creator no longer exists.  
 The rights would only attach to the creator, not to subsequent copyright owners; would apply 
only to human and not corporate creators; and would not apply in cases of works-for-hire. All of 
these limitations can be explained by the nature of the right. It is personal, so attaches only to the 
individual person who created the work in question. 
Where the use is merely making the work available for others for personal use (e.g., 
reproductions for individual readers), no moral rights interest will overcome those purposes. Again, 
the purpose is to prevent harm to the author, not to restrict access to the work.  Therefore, uses that 
are designed only for access or preservation, and carry no possible interpretation of an author’s stamp 
of approval on the use, will not be hindered by moral rights. 
                                                            
477 H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955). 
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However, where a use is made to advance a person, position, or product, or where a publicly 
distributed derivative work results, the author’s interest in making clear her relationship to the effort 
is substantial. Why are these distinguished from other uses?  A use to advance a person, position, or 
product is necessarily a position statement. The work is not being offered as mere information, but to 
support a value statement, usually along the lines of the goodness or rightness of the item or person.  
Derivative works that are publicly distributed are also protected, as they have the potential of 
impacting the author’s reputation, though in a different manner. In most instances, this will apply 
primarily to the shorter copyright term and free uses, as commercial uses would still need to be 
negotiated through the usual mechanisms and an author could exercise her rights through negotiation.  
A few examples of how derivative works could operate to injure an author’s reputation: (1) if a free 
but poorly translated version of a work is widely distributed, it could damage the author’s reputation 
by making it appear that the poor translation was authorized by her; (2) if a movie is bowdlerized, it 
may no longer contain the pieces that the author feels is necessary to convey her intended message; 
and (3) if a drawing of a childhood character is vulgarly modified, it could reduce interest in the 
character by its intended audience.    
In these limited circumstances where moral rights will apply, the author would have three 
rights: 
 
(1) To be notified of the intended use of the work; 
(2) To require or ban the use of her name in relation to the work for the use proposed; and 
(3) To preface the use with a statement of approval or disapproval, the statement of which 
must be displayed/played before every such use. 
 
The first right is simply a notification right so that the author knows how her name is being 
used or how her work has been changed. Where the work is a joint work, all authors must be notified. 
The right carries a concomitant responsibility, though, and would be conditioned on the author’s 
registering her contact information in a free national registry. Notification to the address registered 
would be deemed sufficient to meet the notice requirement, and any creator who fails to keep their 
contact information up to date may not claim to have had this right infringed if notice goes to the 
contact on record. The registry would provide an option for the author to explicitly grant blanket 
determinations on rights two and three. For instance, an author could state that any use of the work in 
political campaigns must be accompanied by a specific statement (e.g., “The artist disapproves of the 
use of the following song for any political purposes, and the use of the song is not an endorsement of 
the candidate by the artist.”).  
The second right is similar to the current rights of attribution and integrity,478 allowing the 
author to distance herself from uses, including derivative works, that she feels are contrary to the 
purpose of her work. This right goes further than the current statute in that (a) it is not limited to 
works of visual art, and (b) it does not limit the removal of her name only to situations where there is 
a “distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her 
                                                            
478 17 U.S.C. § 106A (a) (2012). 
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honor or reputation.”479 It is narrower, though, in that it does not give the author the right to stop 
modification, destruction, or distortion of the work/copy, as such is contrary to the principles of the 
right to alienate property. Once a person has legitimately acquired a manifestation of a work, he may 
destroy, modify or distort it, with the caveat that if he creates a derivative work for further 
redistribution, the moral rights clause would attach to the derivative work.  
The last right merely offers the author a reasonable path for disassociation from views 
offensive to herself without suppressing access. She is under no obligation to issue a statement, but if 
she elects to use the right, any message would be limited in length (e.g., one sentence, no more than 
30 words) to avoid the message being longer than the work itself. The unwieldiness in design of the 
third right is deliberate, intended to advantage the creator. After all, would a political campaign chose 
to use a song by an artist if every use of that song was preceded by a statement of how vile the artist 
feels the use or the user is?  Such a statement would not only disrupt the flow of any event, 
advertisement, or speech, but could also reduce support for the user from an audience moved by the 
prefatory statement. 
To create predictability for the potential user, an exercise of the second and third rights must 
be made within a set number of days (e.g., 30 days) of the notice of use. Failure to respond within 
that time, where there is no explicit blanket determination in the registry, will be deemed as approval 
to use the work with the author’s name attached as the author, and without any prefatory statement. 
Where there is an applicable blanket statement in the registry, the artist’s failure to respond does not 
relieve that user of the obligation to comply with the artist’s exercise of her rights as stated in the 
registry. 
Except in the case of willful infringement, the only remedy available for infringement of 
moral rights would be a non-financial, equitable one. For example, if a political campaign used 
someone’s song without notice, the cure might come in the form of a mandated campaign message to 
its supporters noting the song’s author disapproval of the use.  The remedy in the case of moral rights 
is limited so as not to unduly depress the type of free, creative activities already thriving on platforms 
like YouTube.  
 
Works for Hire 
 
Some of the more troublesome aspects of copyright surface when examining works-for-hire. There 
are the author’s interests in their livelihoods, where it is important not only to have an income stream 
but also to have their name associated with a work that they have created. The former contributes to 
basic living expenses, and the latter contributes to the building of a marketable portfolio. There is 
also an employer’s interest in being able to recoup their investment in an employee and to fully 
exploit a work that they commissioned without the encumbrance of requiring approval from 
contributing artists. And there is the public interest in having certainty about who owns copyright in a 
work and therefore has the authority to exercise its exclusive rights.  
These interests, particularly those of the employer and employee, are at direct odds with each 
other and cannot be evenly balanced. Public dispute over those interests have occasionally played out 
                                                            
479 17 U.S.C. § 106A (a)(2) (2012). 
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in the press, such as those between Jack Kirby and Marvel.480 The following proposal acknowledges 
the imbalance but chooses to continue the advantage of the employer over the employee, just as the 
current code does,481 with the purpose of promoting employment of artists by the entertainment 
industry. But, under certain circumstances, it provides both credit and minimal royalty rights to the 
creator to better represent the author’s interests. The outline of the new work-for-hire doctrine is 
outlined below: 
 
(1) Copyright is held by the employer, though it must be clearly noted as a work-for-hire. 
Exclusive rights can only be exercised by the employer; 
(2) Any creator of the work has the right to have their name listed on every publication of the 
work as a creator;  
(3) At least 5% of net income generated from the exploitation of the work must be 
distributed to the creator(s) that developed 25% or more of the work. 
 
The first principle provides clarity to the public and potential investors on where copyright 
resides and who can negotiate the rights. It also provides an unambiguous statement that the creative 
effort behind the work was actually generated by someone other than the copyright owner. 
The second speaks to the author’s interest in being associated and credited for the work, even 
where she has no other rights, and the obligation to display the creator(s) names will attach regardless 
of how many times the copyright is conveyed to new owners.  
The last requirement establishes a minimum of 5% net income to be split across all creators who 
meet the 25% bar for contribution to a given work. Should the work be subsequently transferred, the 
obligation to pay the 5% transfers to the new owners as well. This provision ensures that creators will 
benefit, even if only slightly, when a work is unexpectedly popular and produces a windfall for the 
copyright owner. Admittedly, in application, there may be problems in assessment of more complex 
works, as there may not be a single “work” when it comes to characters built over many issues of a 
serial publications like comic books, where even the author and illustrator might change during the 
course of the character’s run. Any good faith effort to make such a calculation, though, should be 
sufficient to protect the employer. 
There would be one notable exception to the payment provision, and that is where the employer 
provides the specifications and instructions for design such that the author cannot be considered to be 
an independent actor. For example, where an employer hires a coder to build a program with specific 
instructions on purpose and functionality, and the coder, while perhaps free to use any programming 
language, is so closely tied to the specifications that her work would be considered an outgrowth of 
the employer’s. 
The 5% for all other work-for-hire authors is not determined by any economic analysis but is 
more of a principled statement that the authors of a work deserve some of its profits just as the 
industry deserves to be credited for the investments that it has made. The provision is unlikely to 
                                                            
480 Dominic Patten, Marvel & Jack Kirby Heirs Settle Legal Battle Ahead Of Supreme Court Showdown, DEADLINE 
(September 26, 2014), https://deadline.com/2014/09/jack-kirby-marvel-settlement-lawsuit-supreme-court-hearing-
841711/  
481 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). 
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generate an enormous amount of money for any creator, but in the case where a work is hugely 
popular, it ensures that there are more beneficiaries than just the corporate copyright owner. The 
major creators of a work, or its derivatives, share in the success.  
The 25% designation is similarly arbitrary and could as easily be any other number. The intent is 
to avoid an accounting burden where 100 or more people could arguably claim some hand in creating 
the work. By limiting this financial benefit only to creators who meet a minimum bar, there is no 
impediment to greater contributions but the burden on the employer is circumscribed. The 
unintended consequence of this right could be gaming by employers, by hiring 5 or more people to 
do the work of one, but for two reasons, this seems highly unlikely. 
First, the cost of hiring five people instead of one for an endeavor whose potential success is not 
known at the outset is, in and of itself, a deterrent. Second, given the nature of creative work, it is 
hard to imagine that all five would be equal contributors and would therefore be equally cut out from 
the economic benefits. 
Practically speaking, of course, there will always be works for which no artist has contributed 
25% or more to the work. Movies based on preexisting works are an example, where the artists with 
notable contributions would include authors of the original work, the author of the screenplay, the 
director, the composer for the movie score, etc. Unfortunately, this is also where the shared economic 
benefit would be greatest, but as there is no way to measure contributions so intertwined with each 
other as to make percentages impossible to calculate, it is also where the third principle falls by the 
wayside. 
 These complicated scenarios should still result in some payment to artists, though not directly. In 
the example of the blockbuster movie above, the authors of the original work, if each contributed 
more than 25% to that work, would be entitled to 5% of any licensing fees paid for the use of that 
original work.  
Criticisms of this approach are likely. The 5% net base is minimal, and undoubtedly authors will 
see it as unfair that the monetary rewards of a work that they created largely fall elsewhere. On the 
flip side, employers may believe that the work would not have been created but for the employer’s 
offer of a job. Later transferees may also see the approach as inequitable as they may view the 
commercial success of any derivative work as due to their envisioning, marking, and investment in 
actors. Each of these statements are true to varying degrees, with each person participating in the 
success of a work bearing different costs and gaining different benefits. For the reasons above, 
though, I believe that the proposal addresses identified inequities better than the existing code.  
 
Subject Matter of Copyright 
 
Three changes would be suggested for the subject matter of copyright. The first two would involve 
moving architectural and computer programs outside of the structure above, largely because they are 
different from other types of copyright. Both are highly functional and are intended to be highly 
functional even where design elements are involved. The design elements themselves could still be 
protected under copyright, as visual arts, and receive the same protection as above, but the functional 
pieces should not be viewed in the same light.  
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Despite separating these two works from other types, there remain sufficient interests in 
creators’ rights to justify some protection of these works. In both cases, a single-shorter term --- 10 
years --- for both free and commercial uses seems equitable, allowing each adequate time to sell their 
product. Given how quickly code and technology changes, the 10-year term should not deter a 
creator from investing time in creating programs. They should have ample time before the copyright 
term expires to sell their work. 
In the case of architecture, buildings are visible and on file with necessary municipal offices 
once built, so longer protection similarly does not make sense. Since the 10-year term does not run 
until publication, copyright would not expire until 10 years after the plan to build had been filed, and 
that amount of time should be adequate to build must structures. While there are buildings that have 
taken longer to build (e.g., Taj Mahal), current building practices make it likely that such future 
endeavors would be undertaken in phases with different architectural drawings (and therefore 
different copyright expiration dates) for each phase.  
The last change in subject matter is to explicitly recognize characters as copyrightable and to 
define the elements necessary to obtain such protection. As characters are also fundamentally 
different from other types of copyright, constantly evolving as new details to the character are added 
through new stories, the terms of protection – 20 years for free use, 100 for commercial use - would 




Fair use has stood well the test of time, changing technologies, and innovative uses. Despite the 
criticisms of fair use – primarily how impossible it is to predict the outcome of a fair use case – the 
danger in meddling with the language is that it risks more than it gains. The test is sufficiently 
adaptable only because it is broad and unlimited in the factors that can be considered. The language 




Exhaustion principles would apply to all types of works and all formats. Any license that, through its 
terms, is essentially a transfer – as shaped by Carver’s Perpetual Possession test (i.e. the seller 
intends for the buyer to have continued, perpetual access at the time of the transaction)482 -- would be 
deemed a sale with the usual alienation rights attaching to the licensed work. This interpretation is 
not without precedent, as courts have noted that “[i]t is well-settled that in determining whether a 
transaction is a sale, a lease, or a license, courts look to the economic realities of the exchange.” 483 
                                                            
482 Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887, 1954 (2010). 
483 SoftMan Prod. Co., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Microsoft 
Corp. v. DAK Indus., 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995)); U.S. v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977); Brian W. Carver, 
Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1887, 1954 (2010) (advocating for using a Perpetual Possession test, in that if the licensee is intended to have 
perpetual possession of content that is licensed, it should be treated as a sale). 
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Mass producers of works would still be able to provide blanket access licenses at low cost but 
would be required to provide a purchase option for each work. If the purchase price is deemed 
unreasonable (e.g., $100 for a song) in light of average market costs, users would have a new cause 
of action, to claim misuse of the copyright, with a potential remedy being that the actor loses their 
rights, reverting control of copyright back to the creator.  
Technology has now advanced to the point that first sale can safely be applied to digital items 
while limiting risk. Whether through blockchain484 or digital rights management,485 digital items can 
be locked and controlled or set to disappear upon transfer of rights. While some may argue that any 
technological tool carries risk, as it can be hacked, both technologies are broadly in use now, 
including by publishers, without great harm.486 Further, section 1201 provides a cause of action 
against anyone who does circumvent technology to obtain to copyrighted content.487 
By allowing all legitimately-acquired copies to be alienated, this proposal aims to restore the 
balance of copyright interests that existed with print materials. The owner of the copy has full use of 
the copy, including the rights to reconvey, while the copyright owner has full rights to control the 




Circumvention is considered a copyright-adjacent issue but deserves some mention here. 
Circumvention is essentially the hacking of technology that controls a copyrighted work (e.g., the 
digital rights management applied to an e-book to prevent its copying or sharing). Currently, both 
civil and criminal liability can attach to circumvention, and the broad exceptions applying to 
copyright do not apply to acts of circumvention. The change suggested here is to apply all exceptions 
to circumvention in a manner similar to how they operate with copyright.  
 How this might work: a user who has purchased a technologically-locked-down e-book in a 
particular format (e.g., Kindle) but who no longer has access to the technology to read it, may break 
the technology to access/read the work on a different application. Should the user hack the 
technology to make multiple copies for resale or retain copies made through circumvention after 
reconveyance of the underlying legitimately-acquired copy, though, then she could find herself 
facing both copyright infringement charges and civil or criminal liability for circumvention.  
 The rationale for exceptions to circumvention are largely the same as those for narrowing the 
exclusive rights of copyright. A user should have the right to use a work that he has legitimately 
acquired, even if it means accessing the work through unconventional means. Unless the copy is 
                                                            
484 Two companies are already using blockchain for distribution: Scenarex, https://www.scenarex.ca/en/bookchain/, 
and Publica, https://www.scenarex.ca/en/bookchain/. 
485 Common DRM platforms like Adobe Digital Editions (https://www.adobe.com/solutions/ebook/digital-
editions.html) and Overdrive (https://www.overdrive.com/) are already used by publishers and libraries for lending, 
but similar technologies could be tied to sales, with the expiration of access on the seller’s device set when the new 
owner acquires it.  
486 Admittedly, whether there is harm, as well as how much harm, is hotly debated, as noted in earlier chapters. The 
reason this books takes the position that there is little harm is because, even where piracy is found, there is no data 
that supports the idea that the people who consumed the pirated version would have paid for copy. And the data that 
has been provided by industries on piracy have already been discredited many times over. 
487 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
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distributed publicly or used by more than one person at a time, the copyright owner has no legitimate 




As discussed in earlier chapters, statutory damage provisions as currently written deter innovation 
simply because of the multiplication factor involved with every perceived infringement. Industries 
can and have pursued statutory damages against individuals for thousands if not millions,488 even in 
cases where was no actual proof of infringement,489 and the sheer amount possible to obtain through 
statutory damages encourages overuse and intimidation tactics.  
For that reason, no statutory damages should be permitted, with any compensation tied directly to 
actual damages and costs plus punitive damages where the infringer has knowingly and willfully 
violated the law,490 with no reasonable belief that his actions fell under one of the exceptions (e.g., 
fair use) in the code. Punitive damages could also be awarded for repeat offenders, deceptive 




In suggesting an alternative copyright framework, I am not intimating that this is the only, or even 
necessarily the best, configuration. But it is one that pushes against commonly accepted principles, 
such as a singular, indivisible copyright term and that overall does a better job at serving the public’s 
and the average author’s interests than our current set of laws. The public deserves to be served in a 
more meaningful manner than it is now, and given the growing wealth gap across the nation,491 our 
attention should focus not only on how to narrow the gap but also how to prevent that gap from 
increasing divides elsewhere, such as in information.  
 
                                                            
488 Record Industry Sues Hundreds of Internet Music Swappers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2003), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/08/technology/record-industry-sues-hundreds-of-internet-music-swappers.html. 
489 Joe Dangelo, RIAA Drops Piracy Suit Against 66-Year-Old Grandmother, MTV (Sept. 9, 2003), 
http://www.mtv.com/news/1479303/riaa-drops-piracy-suit-against-66-year-old-grandmother/. 
490 An example of what type of action might constitute “knowingly and willfully,” see Tenenbaum’s conduct as 
described in Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 495 (1st Cir. 2011). 
491 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2013); Jaison R. Abel 
& Richard Deitz, Why Are Some Places So Much More Unequal Than Others?, 25 ECON. POL’Y REV. 58 (2019), 
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